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I. Stating the Problem
The rapid liberalization and growth of international trade and investment have gener
issues that are not adequately addressed either by global governance mechanisms ot
national legal systems. Principal among the issues is developing and implementing a b,
of norms expressing the responsibilities of international firms for the human rights impa
of their operations. There has been a dramatic increase in both the scale and complexity
the human rights issues arising from the emergence of international production methc
and economic globalization generally-not least because of the accompanying erosion
the effective authority of the state institutions to whom human rights norms are addresst
and who are charged with their enforcement. This article examines the principal mech.
nisms that have emerged to bolster state responsibility for the enforcement of human right
norms against transnational corporations (TNCs)1 The article argues that, because o
limitations inherent in the other principal mechanisms, what is presently required is
*Professor of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. This article was written while visiting
the Centre for Corporate and Commercial Law at the University of Cambridge. I am grateful for the hospitality
of the Centre and the support of its Director, Dr. Eilis Ferran. This article benefited greatly from the comments
of participants at a Faculty Forum at the Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law in January
2003.
1. The term "transnational corporation" is used here to refer to firms (typically groups of companies) under
common ownership or significant economic influence whose income-generating operations cross national bor-
ders. Such firms are also variously called international or multinational; some entities in the group may be
unincorporated. The reference to the transnational corporation will be either to the corporate group or the
ultimate parent company, depending on the context. The elements of this definition are discussed in PETER
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENrTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 (revised ed. 1999). In 2002, the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported a total of 64,592 parent corporations in
the latest available national reporting year, with 851,167 foreign affiliates. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT
COMPETITIVENESS 270-273 (Annex table A.1.3) (2002) [hereinafter UNCTAD]. Over the past ten years, the
number of parent corporations has almost doubled (from 35,000) and foreign affiliates have increased more
than five times (from 150,000). UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT 1992: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS ENGINES OF GROWTH (1992).
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new or strengthened international coordinating mechanism to secure broad agreement as
to the desirable content of norms of TNC responsibility and provide a modality for their
implementation.
There has been a quiet revolution in the development of international human rights
since World War 11. 2 The human rights revolution represents the highest human aspi-
rations for social amelioration. It carries the hopes and claims of the most marginal, the
dispossessed and weakest on the planet; the satisfaction of their needs is the primary
responsibility of national and global institutions and the ultimate source of their moral
legitimacy. The development of a body of human rights standards reflects the interna-
tional judgment that protection of these rights is too important to be left to national
governments exclusively but is a matter of joint, global responsibility. The bedrock of
these rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),3
adopted by resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. The
Universal Declaration is directed to the protection of human dignity through its expres-
sion of fundamental rights and freedoms. Although primarily directed to state conduct,
the Universal Declaration also addresses nonstate actors. Thus, the preamble to the Uni-
versal Declaration declares that it expresses "a common standard of achievement for all
peoples" and enjoins "every individual and every organ of society" to promote respect
for the rights and freedoms and secure their observance. 4
Two broad streams of human rights are recognized in the Universal Declaration. One
stream, further elaborated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,'
protects individual civil and political rights such as the right to life and liberty, protection
against egregious harms such as torture and slavery, freedom of association and of thought,
conscience, and religion. The second, further expressed in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 6 protects cognate freedoms in the economic and
social sphere, including just and favorable conditions of work, the right to form and join
trade unions, and the protection of children and young persons against exploitation. Also
expressed are economic and social rights with a more collective dimension, such as the right
to an adequate standard of living, rights to adequate food, housing, health, and education,
to development, and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. Al-
though human rights are declared universal, indivisible, and interdependent, there is in-
evitably a tension, ideologically rooted, between the two streams.7
Business has a unique capacity to advance human rights goals. It is a powerful vehicle for
economic, social, and cultural amelioration, particularly in developing countries via job
2. The term "international human rights" is used here to refer to rights recognized by international orga-
nizations such as the United Nations or recognized by governments as deserving international protection as
human rights.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I1), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
4. Id. The preamble probably does not itself create binding legal obligations since it is expressed as a dec-
laration rather than a treaty or convention to which states are signatories. Its moral and political force is,
however, profound.
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
7. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INr' L.J. 201, 217
(2001).
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creation and diffusion of technology, scientific advances, and management skills. Foreign
direct investmente may both promote economic development in the host country and pow-
erfully affect the enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, from health, food, and im-
proved living standards to rights of free expression and access to information through new
technologies. Corporate operations, however, also pose a distinct body of threats to the
enjoyment of human rights either through their own conduct or through complicity in the
host government's invasion of rights. The principal recurrent concerns are with labor rights
(freedom of association and collective bargaining, the use of child labor and bonded or
forced labor, and the provision of decent and safe working conditions), working in areas of
conflict, the domestic allocation of revenues from corporate operations, bribery, and cor-
ruption (which weakens both revenues and trust in government), the use of state (military)
and private security forces to secure corporate operations, and ensuring respect for indige-
nous people's rights.9 Economic globalization has added a dimension of concern with prob-
lems arising from the unequal distribution of globalization's benefits and consequent social
marginalization. 1° These problems are ubiquitous; they are not confined to large interna-
tional firms. It is said that "[tihere are few companies today which do not confront human
rights problems.""
Human rights form part of international law-the law of nations. International instru-
ments creating human rights are primarily addressed to states, largely on the basis that the
state's monopoly over coercive power makes it the principal threat to the enjoyment of
rights and in fidelity to the traditional conception of international law as the creation
of states and the expression of their sovereignty. 2 Corporations are bound by those rules
of international law that are applicable to all persons although such rules are largely re-
stricted to fundamental norms such as those enjoining genocide, torture, slavery and forced
labor, crimes against humanity, and extra-judicial murder. 3 Human rights treaties may im-
pose obligations directly upon corporations without their participation in the negotiation
of the instrument or consent to the terms. 4 While many provisions of human rights treaties
8. Foreign direct investment refers to an investment made with effective management control over an
enterprise in another country. Portfolio investment is an investment made without such control intent, usually
by a pension fund or other institutional investor.
9. See PRINCE OF WALES INT'L Bus. LEADERS FORUM & AMNESTY INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS-Is IT ANY OF
YOUR BUSINESS? 8-61 (2000). In litigation against TNCs for direct violations of human rights, they have also
been accused of violating the right to life and its enjoyment, of causing injury to health, torture and cruel or
degrading treatment, of breach of the freedom from arbitrary detention, from discrimination and the freedom
to enjoy property. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 801, 817-25 (2002). Most of these allegations concern civil and political rights. Key concerns in
relation to economic and social rights include the free choice in work, the payment of fair wages, a "decent
living" and equal remuneration for work of equal value, the provision of safe and healthy working conditions,
the protection of children from economic exploitation, and the protection of mothers.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 52-60.
11. Sir Geoffrey Chandler, Keynote Address: Crafting a Human Rights Agenda for Business, in HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 40 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999).
12. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (Vol. 1, 1905) ("[s]ince the Law of Nations is based on
the common consent of individual States, States solely and exclusively are the subjects of International Law").
13. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443,466-
67 (2001). However, corporations also face criminal liability under conventions governing corruption and the
transportation of hazardous waste.
14. Id. at 475-88. Thus, international environmental treaties impose civil liabilities directly upon private
actors such as ship owners responsible for environmental pollution. U.N. General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions require business corporations to comply with economic and other sanctions imposed by
resolution.
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are generally expressed as potentially applicable to nonstate actors as well as to state parties,
outside the European Union framework, it is only in exceptional circumstances that cor-
porations are expressly and directly regulated under international human rights law. In
contrast, there is much less reluctance to grant rights directly to corporations under inter-
national instruments, particularly those protecting investment and promoting trade, in-
cluding through access to international dispute resolution mechanisms. Indeed, in recent
years there has been a rich accretion of rights to enterprises under international law, par-
ticularly against states that host investment.
5
There are few mechanisms under international law to enforce human rights standards
against nonstate actors outside the criminal sphere. 16 Thus, there is no international court
or tribunal to adjudicate claims against corporations for breach of human rights standards
and relatively few informal means such as might be invoked against states under the United
Nations treaty monitoring system.17 Similarly, there are no international mechanisms to
enforce the human rights obligations imposed upon TNCs by national legislation. States,
however, have been held responsible in isolated cases for failing to prevent or remedy human
rights abuses committed by private actors such as TNCs. 1
Responsibility for implementation and enforcement of international human rights norms
against private actors such as TNCs primarily lies at the national level. Human rights
standards are applied indirectly to corporations, through the state in which they are incor-
porated (their home state) I9 or through the state in which they are operating (the host state).
In practice, there are formidable obstacles to home state regulation of the offshore activities
of locally incorporated companies, much less of their foreign affiliates. Responsibility for
domestic implementation and enforcement of international law norms, therefore, lies with
the host state through its national laws, and the first point of redress for victims is to its
national courts. The obligations assumed by states ratifying human rights treaties, therefore,
do not merely require them to respect those rights in their own practice and that of public
officials but may also, depending on treaty terms and purpose, require them to exercise due
diligence in protecting their populations against breach by others, including private actors
such as TNCs.20 The leverage of governments over TNCs, however, is weakened by power
15. Id. at 458-59 (rights commonly conferred upon private corporations under bilateral investment treaties).
Corporations are authorized to bring action under several ad hoc panels and procedures (e.g., the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, NAFTA).
16. However, see the mechanism under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO Tri-
partite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprses and Social Policy for non-binding interpretative
procedures with respect to the Guidelines and Declaration that they have adopted concerning international
business operations. See infra text accompanying notes 159-166.
17. The mechanisms for direct international enforcement against TNCs are canvassed in INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARIsM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 99-116 (2002).
18. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 17, at 83-88 (through U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies that hear complaints from individuals about abuses by their states and regional human rights
tribunals).
19. The Barcelona Traction Co., (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 I.CJ. 3.
20. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 17, at 51-53 (citing the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988) and speculating on what this might portend for
development of a generalized due diligence standard). JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-
SION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 81-82 (2002) (the ILC's articles on state responsibility do not lay
down a general rule as to standards of attribution of conduct beyond that of state organs and officials; the
international instrument may, therefore, express the state parties' obligations under it to prevent, investigate
and punish prohibited acts in terms of the due diligence or a like standard).
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differentials resulting from differences in relative economic size, the increased mobility of
investment capital, and the resulting competition between potential host countries for lower
regulatory barriers to foreign direct investment.2' Of course, TNCs should comply with
laws enacted by host countries in discharging obligations assumed under international law;
however, power differentials and the problems inherent in enforcing domestic laws against
global organizations compromise the prospects of host governments enforcing those stan-
dards against TNCs. This is particularly a concern for countries without a strong com-
mitment to the rule of law or institutions to secure its observance. Economic globalization
has accentuated these power differentials.2
Another consequence of the statist character of international human rights is that little
guidance is given to corporations regarding the norms that should frame their human rights
observance and define their responsibilities. The human rights standards contained in in-
ternational instruments are addressed to state conduct, almost exclusively, in the case of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In view of the different
functions of states and corporations, standards addressed to states require translation if they
are to provide clear guidance to TNCs with respect to conduct and responsibilities.2'
Corporate law does not explicitly address the problem of corporate compliance with
human rights standards; indeed, its systemic orientation aggravates the problem of standard
setting and compliance. The economic objective of the business corporation is the maxi-
mization of corporate profit and shareholder gain. While directors have discretion as to the
means by which these ends are to be achieved, they are not at liberty to substitute other
ends and purposes, such as those of general social amelioration14 The resulting ethic of
corporate law is one of vicarious acquisitiveness, respecting its core function of protecting
the deployment of other people's money. Corporate law's concerns are accordingly with
financial accountability to investors and the integrity of markets for corporate stock. Hu-
man rights concerns are, for the most part, extraneous to corporate regulation, culture, and
doctrines.
The corporation's profit orientation is not, however, incompatible with the development
of a culture of human rights observance although it is unlikely to supply the drivers for it
21. The revenues of TNCs often exceed those of the countries who are host to their operations. In 2000,
of the world's 100 largest economic entities ranking both states and corporations, twenty-nine were TNCs
(the corresponding figure in 1990 was twenty-four). Press Release, UNITED NATIONS CONPERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT, ARE TRANSNATIONALS BIGGER THAN COUNTRIEs? (TAD/NF/PR/47 Dec. 8, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.unctad.org/remplates/Webflyer.asp?doclD = 2426&intltemlD = 2068&lang = I (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2003).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
23. Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies
for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 34-35 (2002).
24. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Hutton v. West Cork Ry. Co.,
23 Ch. D. 654, 671 (C.A, 1883 per Bowen LJ.) ("The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale,
but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company"), cited in THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
§ 2.01(a), Vol. 1 (1994) (the Institute uses the term "enhancement" rather than "maximization" to define the
corporation's economic objective). This ethic of profit maximization is supported by competition in product
and service markets and by the structure of financial incentives such as the linkage of senior management
remuneration to corporate stock price as the measure of corporate performance to the virtual exclusion of
other indicators and standards. The argument for profit maximization as the economic norm apt for United
States enterprise in present market and social conditions is developed in Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate
Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance--Two Models of the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1983).
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since human rights compliance is not cost neutral and may cut against the business drive
for cost reduction and profits." The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance (Principles) qualifies the corporation's economic objective of profit and shareholder
wealth maximization by recognizing the corporation's character as a social institution as
well.26 Thus, the Principles state that, notwithstanding its economic objective, the corpo-
ration must act within the boundaries set by law;" further, it "[m]ay take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business."2s The Principles would also permit the corporation to devote a reasonable amount
of resources "to public welfare [and] humanitarian ... purposes." 9 They demonstrate the
existence in legal doctrine of a qualified license to comply with international human rights
standards even where they do not enjoy prescriptive legal force but nonetheless attract
significant normative support in the social communities in which the corporation operates
and from which it draws investment support. 3°
There is, however, stimulus for corporate human rights sensitivity in an evident shift in
community expectation with respect to corporate behaviour and its social impacts.3' This
shift is partly expressed in the growth in socially responsive investment, that is, investment
funds that screen out corporations from the pool of potential investments (or conversely,
target them) on the basis of social criteria.3 2 The movement is complemented by the in-
creasing use of the federal proxy machinery to place precatory resolutions raising social
concerns on the agenda of corporate AGMs. 3 Product market-based responses through the
25. Stock price remains the primary measure of corporate performance and thereby the driving financial
and cultural norm of corporate conduct, through the cumulative effect of legal norms, the structure of executive
compensation (particularly the central role of stock options), and the pervasive threat of management displace-
ment through hostile takeovers.
26. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 24, § 2.01.
27. Id. at 61 ("to the same extent as a natural person-no less but no more").
28. Id. § 2.01(b)(2).
29. Id. § 2.01(b)(3) (permitting the corporation to "take into account, within reason, public-welfareconcems
relevant to groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as employees, customers, suppliers,
and members of the communities within which the corporation operates." Id. at 65). The economic objective
"does not imply that the corporation must extract the last penny of profit out of every transaction in which it
is involved." Id. at 57. See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize Sharebolder
Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing,
Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1998) (examining the several guises in which apparently
philanthropic conduct may indirectly advance corporate utility).
30. Thus, a Comment to § 2.01(b)(2) adds that a corporate official "should be permitted to take into account
emerging ethical principles, reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, that
have significant support although less-than-universal acceptance." THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUrTE, supra note
24, at 63. The commentary to the Principles states that "there is direct or indirect authoritative support [in legal
doctrine] for all of the principles embodied in § 2.01." Id. at 55. Substantially similar principles are to be found
in other corporate law systems, even those with legal traditions that attach greater weight to the social dimen-
sions of business enterprise.
31. See, e.g., Chris Avery, Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000); Chan-
dler, supra note 11, at 39.
32. Approximately 9 percent of funds under professional management in the United States are invested
using social screens. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Tram-
parency, 112 -ARv. L. REv. 1197, 1287 (1999).
33. In 1998, thirteen social policy proposals concerning human rights were placed upon the agendas of
publicly held corporations; two were omitted by management and the remaining eleven attracted an average
of 5.9 percent of the votes cast. Proposals concerning labor and environmental standards received on average
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adoption of codes of conduct and social labels have proliferated, signalling voluntary com-
pliance with social and human rights norms.14
Thus, both international law and corporate law substantially ignore the effect of cor-
porate activity upon the enjoyment of human rights; the former does so because of its
preoccupation with constraining state abuse of human rights and the latter through the
thrall cast by the norms of profit maximization and primacy of shareholder interests. The
effect of globalization has been to undermine state-based accountability structures by en-
hancing the power of private actors at the expense of states; it also contributed to the
abandonment of the movement towards the development of an international legal regime
governing TNC operations."
This article examines the principal strategies that have emerged to support corporate
responsiveness to human rights norms. These strategies are: (1) the pursuit of litigation
remedies against TNCs and their foreign affiliates under national legal systems, principally
in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act for harms suffered by aliens; (2) the devel-
opment of market-based strategies through codes of conduct voluntarily adopted by TNCs
to signal observance of human rights standards; and (3) the incipient movement towards
international coordination in standard-setting concerning TNCs and human rights.36 The
central argument of this article is that the litigation and market-based strategies have viti-
ating weakness as primary solutions to the problem of standard-setting and enforcement,
and the optimum long-term solution lies in more effective international coordination to
develop a body of norms specifically addressed to business operations and to secure their
implementation.
The structure of the article follows this argument. Part H looks at some consequences
of economic globalization for human rights protection. Part III assesses domestic litigation
remedies for corporate human rights violations. Part IV examines market-based strategies
through voluntary measures assumed by business to signal commitment to human rights
or other social standards. Part V examines the present institutions for international coor-
dination in human rights standard-setting and enforcement and explores the merits and
modalities for their extension. Part VI draws together conclusions.
9.2 percent of votes. See IRRC, SocIAL POLICY SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS IN 1998: IssuEs, VOTES AND VIEWS
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (1999), quoted in MELVIN ARON EISENBERO, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 326-327 (8th ed., 2000). Recently, it has been proposed by a com-
mentator that the Securities and Exchange Commission exercise its power to compel disclosure under the proxy
rules of social information as to how a corporation generates its profits and not merely the extent of those
profits. See Williams, supra note 32, at 1201-02 (arguing that the SEC has authority under the proxy rules to
require disclosure of social information and should do so; expanded social disclosure would include information
as to products and countries of operation, its legal compliance structure, global labor practices, and environ-
mental effects). See also Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements? 115 HARv. L. REv.
1433 (2002) (arguing for mandatory social disclosure by reference to the importance of the information,
whether it is currently being collected, profit effects of activities associated with the disclosed information, and
third-party effects).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 107-155.
35. See infra text accompanying note 157.
36. National measures have also been taken to bolster corporate human rights observance such as human
rights conditionality measures and the U. S. Generalized System of Preferences. See Philip Alston, Labor Rights
Provisions in U. S. Trade Law: "Aggressive Liberalism"? in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 71 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
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H. Some Consequences of Economic Globalization for
Human Rights Protection
When the United Nations and its human rights system were created the state "had few
rivals."" The position is radically different a half century later, particularly under the in-
fluence of globalization. While globalization is not a new phenomenon, recent develop-
ments have profoundly altered the relative roles and capacities of state and nonstate actors,
with the state sphere substantially displaced in favour of markets and private actors, espe-
cially TNCs. Globalization marks a transformation in the international economic system
that is qualitatively different from the relationships of economic interdependence that had
developed between states since World War 11.3 8 Globalization has powerful impacts upon
the machinery for the protection of human rights and the systemic achievement of its goals
of social and human development.
A. THE CHARACTER OF MODERN GLOBALIZATION
In its modern phase, globalization is a process marked by rapid economic integration
across national borders, stimulated by deregulation of cross-border economic activity in the
mid-1980s and contemporary advances in information and communications technology. 9
These advances permit dramatic reductions in the time and cost of global transportation
and a greatly enhanced capacity for central management of global business operations. One
manifestation has been rapid growth in international trade and foreign direct investment;4°
short-term capital flows have also increased dramatically following integration of financial
markets, even dwarfing the growth in global trade. 41 The pattern of FDI flows suggests that
economic integration and its consequent benefits are concentrated in the economically
developed states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).4 2
Globalization is marked by the adoption of new technologies in the reorganization of
production networks on a global scale. Cheaper global transport and communications tech-
nology permit management of a dispersed production network. International production
systems-referring to production under the common governance of TNCs43-source com-
37. OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3 (1995).
38. Wolfgang H. Reinicke & Jan Martin Witte, Interdependence, Globalization and Sovereignty: The Role of
Non-Binding International Legal Accords, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NoN-BINDING NORMS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 77-78 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
39. There are other manifestations beyond the economic, propelled by the same technological and com-
munications advances; less benign instances include drug trafficking and terrorism. The present focus is upon
economic globalization.
40. Thus, aggregate FDI inflows in 2000 were six times the annual average for 1990-1995, although in 2001,
the multiple fell to three. UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 303 (Annex table B.I). FDI in 1997 was seven times the
level in real terms in the 1970s. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1999, at 25 (1999).
41. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, WORKING PARTY ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LIBERAL-
IZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, COUNTRY STUDIES ON THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION: FINAL REPORT,
para. 24, GB.276/WP/SDL/1 (1999) ("The worldwide daily turnover in foreign exchange markets in 1998 was
at least 78 times the daily volume of exports of goods and services, up from 56 times in 1989.").
42. See infra text accompanying note 48.
43. UNCTAD,supra note 1, at 3.
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ponents and stages of production to sites of lowest cost, with multi-country locations for
different stages of production, often distinguished by the relative sophistication of each
phase of production. For tradable goods and services, the issue is where to locate production
facilities and other functions for maximum efficiency. There is also an increase in "arms-
length" production through long-term subcontracting, licensing, and franchising arrange-
ments in addition to earlier modes of FDI through establishment or acquisition of foreign
branches and subsidiaries. The components of these international production networks are
highly mobile and relatively easily transferable. TNCs, not governments, have been the
principal drivers of these developments.-
Globalization is far from uniform in its reach and there are stark disparities in the dis-
tribution of FDI flows. International investment flows are almost exclusively from sources
in industrialized nations and flow predominantly to other industrialized countries, mostly
in the OECD and a few emerging markets.45 They are focussed on high value-added knowl-
edge and R&D-intensive activities." In 2001, about 80 percent of FDI flows were through
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 47 FDI in developing countries is mostly in the form
of investment in extractive resource, greenfield, and labor-intensive operations. In 2001, 28
percent of FDI flowed to developing countries, well below the annual average of 35 percent
flowing to this sector in 1993-98.48 In 2001, the ten largest developing country recipients
accounted for 75 percent of total flows to that sector; the level of concentration of FDI
among developing countries has increased in recent years. 49 The forty-nine least-developed
countries are effectively marginalized from the FDI process: they received less than 2 per-
cent of total flows to the developing world and 0.5 percent of world FDI in 2001.10 They
rely heavily upon official development assistance whose aggregate amount is roughly equal
to their total FDI inflows; for developing countries as a group, FDI exceeded official de-
velopment assistance in 2000 by a multiple of ten to one."'
B. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION FOR THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The recent drive of modern international economic cooperation has principally been to
encourage international capitalism rather than to moderate its social effects. The individual
developments that together make up globalization significantly affect the enjoyment of
economic and social rights as well as civil and political rights.
The benefits of globalization are evident in advances in science, technology, and com-
munications. Cross-country studies show that in most cases they are also correlated in the
44. The globalization of business has been followed by the rapid growth of global, relatively autonomous,
civil society organizations engaged in advocacy concerning trade, labor, business, consumer, environment and
human rights issues. This development has provided a force to moderate to some degree the social and human
rights effects of globalization.
45. The industrialized world's share of FDI ranged from 61 percent to 82 percent in the period from 1986
to 2001. UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 7 (T able 1.2).
46. Reinicke & Witte, supra note 38, at 79.
47. These figures are broadly typical of those applying since the mid-1980s although the trend towards
TNC investment through cross-border M & A is evident only since 1993 and declined in 2001. UNCTAD,
upra note 1, at 4 (Table 1.1).
48. Id. at 7 (Table 1.2).
49. Id. at II (Figure 1.5).
50. Id. at 9, 1.
51. Id. at 12-13 (Table 1.8).
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longer term with higher rates of economic growth and productivity increases for the econ-
omy as a whole. 2 However, globalization sits uneasily with a state-based system of inter-
national human rights. It "represents the emergence of a single integrated economic space
cutting across political spaces"; its organizational logic is that of "corporate industrial net-
works and their financial relationships."53 It is antithetical to the systemic goals of human
rights protection in three principal respects. First, at a fundamental level its logic is driven
by the "wellbeing of capital rather than of people";1 4 the imperatives of economic and social
rights, and often of civil and political rights, are in opposition to those of global cost min-
imization that affect the economic calculus underlying the siting of international produc-
tion. Second, although it is claimed that globalization indirecdy supports civil freedom and
democracy since they are conducive to success in a market economy,"5 the fungible character
of the elements of international production and the mobility of FDI undermines the sense
of social solidarity in a host community and weakens the commitment to those who are
economically and socially disadvantaged. Third and most fundamental, while globalization
does not formally negate state sovereignty, globalization's effect is to subvert state sover-
eignty since globalization negates the state's monopoly of legitimate power over its
territory:
Governments, bound by territoriality, cannot project their power over the total space in which
production and consumption organize themselves. Globalization thus integrates along the eco-
nomic dimension and simultaneously fragments along the political.56
Hence, globalization has been accompanied in both developed and developing countries
by a reduced role for the state through deregulation of the economy (including controls
over prices and markets for commodities) and the privatization of public enterprise. 7
Another manifestation is ideological and business pressure under globalization to entrust
responsibility for the social impacts of enterprise to the private sector and away from the
state.58
For many developing countries with high debt servicing obligations, the imposition by
international financial institutions of structural adjustment programs as a condition of as-
sistance has led to cutbacks in social services and amenities and has negatively impacted the
enjoyment of human rights. Further, evidence suggests that the benefits of globalization
are unevenly spread, have increased disparities of wealth and living conditions, and aggra-
52. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, WORKING PARTY ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LIBERAL-
IZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 41, para. 30.
53. Reinicke & Witte, supra note 38, at 80.
54. RIcHRD FALKC, HUMAN RIGHTS HORIZONS: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 185
(2000).
55. William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS Q.
368 (1996) (positive correlation between level of FDI and host's respect for civil and political rights and
economic and social rights in the third world). But this of itself does not show that FDI increases respect for
human rights norms since it may simply mark a preference for stable political environments and the desire to
avoid negative publicity. Menno T. Kamminga, Holding Multinational CorporationsAccountablefor Human Rigbts
Abuses: A Challengefor the EC, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 554 (Philip Alston ed., 1999).
56. Reinicke & Witte, supra note 38, at 82.
57. Philip Alston, The Universal Declaration in an Era of Globalization, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HuiAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 29 (Barend van der Heijden & Bahia
Tahzib-Lie eds., 1998).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 107-108.
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vated social marginalization in some of the least developed countries.5 9 It has been argued
that globalization has produced a "sea of stark disparity" with growing problems of fatal
disease, hunger, inadequate clothing, insufficient shelter, labor dislocation, and the lack of
food in many parts of the world.-°
C. THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION UPON HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
It is striking that the developing countries' relatively modest (and declining) share of FDI
has occurred in a period when many have dramatically reduced local barriers to FDI and
sought to attract FDI through liberalized entry and operational conditions, guarantees, and
incentives such as the extension of tax holidays, exemptions from import duties, and the
offer of direct subsidies.61 Thus, the effect of 93 percent of the changes made by states to
foreign investment regimes in 2001 was to create a more favorable investment climate. 62
Similarly in the 1990s, many developing countries entered into bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) with developed countries (the home states of TNCs) governing the investment re-
lationship between TNC and the host state. BITs are generally "heavily skewed" in favor
of foreign investors, including through the right to bypass local courts in favor of inter-
national arbitration without consent of the host. Accordingly, a denser legal relationship
exists between host state and TNC, and the host state assumes significant legal responsi-
bilities to TNCs under various international investment agreements.6 Host states are now
forced to be more accommodating to TNCs, which are more embedded in the host econ-
omy than before. They are supported by a phalanx of international mechanisms supporting
trade and investment liberalization and sanctioning the former.M
These liberalizing measures are rational responses to the competitive auction for inter-
national investment. They also mark the considerable enhancement of the economic power
of TNCs in negotiating the terms of FDI. The nature of international production systems,
with their disaggregation and global distribution of the elements of production, accentuates
the mobility of investment capital. The system of FDI incentives rests precisely upon the
mobility of investment and the prospect of the economic calculus favoring relocation to
lower cost sites. This does not mean that such costs are the exclusive determinants of FDI;
productivity and effective net output remain fundamental considerations.
Therefore, considerable pressures are felt by governments in the developing world
to attract investment by lowering the cost of local production. A regulatory framework
59. See, e.g., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT t998, U.N. Development Programme, at 29 ("In 1960 the 20%
of the world's people who live in the richest countries had 30 times the income of the poorest 20%-by 1995
82 times as much income."). UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 40, at 28 ("more than a
quarter of the 4.5 billion people in developing countries still do not have some of life's most basic choices-
survival beyond age 40, access to knowledge and minimum private and public services.").
60. J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human
Rights: Progress Report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, para. 7 (2001).
61. GORDON H. HANSON, SHOULD COUNTRIES PROMOTE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT? UNCTAD, G-24
Discussion Paper Series No. 9 (2001), quotedin INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, WORKING PARTY ON THE SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION, INVESTMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DECENT WORK, GB.285/WP/
SDG/2, para. 6.
62. HANSON, supra note 61, Box 1.2.
63. Ramer, supra note 13, at 458-59.
64. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 551 (1998).
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attractive to TNCs is a significant element of this competitive environment. These pressures
are also manifest in the creation of Export Production Zones or Special Economic Zones
in which labor regimes are attenuated in the interests of attracting international investment.
In this competitive environment for FDI, it is unrealistic not to acknowledge that these
pressures towards cost reductions will translate into like pressures upon labor conditions,
environmental protection, occupational health and safety regulation, and other protections
that have cost imposts upon international production. While host states have obligations
under international law to implement and enforce international human rights obligations,
they often have neither the interest nor resources to monitor TNC operations and have
limited capacity to enforce those standards against powerful global actors. 65 As TNCs be-
come more international in their operations, with less attachment to a national home base,
they become more independent of government and less amenable to either home or host
control.66
H. Litigation Remedies for Human Rights Breaches under
National Law
One strategy for the protection of human rights is through civil litigation against TNCs
in national courts for conduct that breaches international law, either through their own acts
or through complicity in state violations. The principal civil remedy against TNCs is that
granted under jurisdiction conferred upon United States federal courts by the Alien Tort
Claims Act of 1789 (ATCA) to hear damages claims by aliens for violations of international
law wherever conmitted.61 No direct counterpart to the ATCA exists in other national
legal systems although there appears to be scope under the legal systems of some European
states for national courts to give effect to international legal norms where the applicable
national law is either incompatible with those norms or offers a lower level of protection. 6s
Since these latter remedies are barely nascent, the present focus is principally upon litigation
under the ATCA.69
65. Ratner, supra note 13, at 462 (citing AMNESTY INT'L & PAx CHRISTI INT'L, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 17-18 (2000)).
66. Ratner, supra note 13, at 463.
67. Foreign plaintiffs have also brought civil actions in U.S. courts against U.S. parents and foreign affiliates
under common law doctrines for wrongs committed abroad, alleging toxic emissions, defective drugs and
environmental damage. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human RightsAgainst Multinational Corporations Under
United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. CoMp. L. 493, 503 (2002).
68. Andre Nollkaemper, Public International Law in Transational Litigation AgainstMultinationalCorporations:
Prospects and Problems in the Courts of the Netherlands, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 265-282 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000); Gerrit Betlem, Tram-
national Litigation Against Multinational Corporations Before Dutch Civil Courts, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 283-305 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000)
(examining feasibility of bringing proceedings alleging violations by TNCs in developing countries in Dutch
civil courts).
69. There are sympathetic developments elsewhere. Thus, common law courts will ordinarily decline juris-
diction by staying proceedings where the judicial system of another country is prima facie more convenient for
the trial of the action. However, in two recent decisions involving claims against the U.K. -incorporated parent
of their South African employer, the House of Lords declined to stay proceedings despite the balance of
convenience favoring foreign determination of the claims; the reasons for doing so reflected a concern for legal
and economic obstacles to the vindication of the rights asserted. The two decisions fall far short of fashioning
a remedy comparable to that created by the ATCA for breach of international legal norms. However, within
their narrow doctrinal focus they are in sympathy with recent developments under the ATCA to provide a
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A. CIVIL REMEDIES AGAINST TNCs UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT (U.S.)
The ATCA provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
claim by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations." 0 The
provision lay dormant after its enactment by the First Congress" until 1980 when it was
invoked in a tort action against a former Paraguayan police chief by the sister of another
Paraguayan who had died under torture in police custody in Paraguay. The court held that
a government's torture of its own citizens, perpetrated under color of state authority, vio-
lated universally accepted principles of international law." Subsequently, civil actions have
been taken by foreign nationals for human rights abuses committed abroad by foreign
officials and, latterly, TNCs.5
Action under the ATCA must be brought by an alien for a "tort only," which has been
"committed in violation of the laws of nations." 4 The first element is unproblematic.
Whilst the second element excludes claims based upon contract or other remedy of a clearly
non-tortious character, the plaintiff is not put to proof of the elements of a cause of action
for tort under a particular municipal legal system. The reason is that the ATCA "not only
confers jurisdiction but also creates a cause of action." 5 Hence, the plaintiff need only
legal forum for the enforcement of civil rights affected by TNC operations abroad. See Connelly v. R.T.Z.
Corp. Plc. 1998 A.C. 854; Lubbe v. Cape Plc 2000, 4 All E.R. 268. See also Richard Meeran, Liability of
Multinational Corporations: A Critical Stage in the UK, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000); Richard Meeran, The Un-
veiling of Transnational Corporations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARD AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 161-170 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); P. T. Muchlinski, Corporations in International Litigation:
Problems of.7urisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos Cases, 50 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1 (2001); Richard Meeran,
Accountability of Transnationals for Human Rights Abuses, 148 NEW L. J. 1686-87, 1706-07 (1998).
70. The Act is now codified in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350. Other potential civil remedies against TNCs before
U.S. courts are under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and for quo warranto proceed-
ings for forfeiture or cancellation of a corporation's charter for repeated infringements of international law.
Avery, supra note 31, at 17-74. Each remedy is more theoretical than real under present jurisprudence, at least
with respect to TNCs.
71. The original intent of the provision was 'to assure aliens access to federal courts to vindicate any incident
which, if mishandled by a state court, might blossom into an international crisis.... The focus of attention,
then, was on acts occurring within the territory of the United States, or perpetrated by a United States citizen,
against an alien. For these acts the United States was responsible.' Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards J. concurring),
72. Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The action was founded upon the defendant's
presence in the United States and consequent amenability to the jurisdiction of its courts.
73. The literature on the Filirtiga decision and its progeny is voluminous. Stephens reports that a 'Westlaw
search for "Filartiga" in August 2001 ... turned up 900 references in the Journal and Law Review database,
with articles addressing a range of historical, constitutional, procedural, and human rights issues.' Stephens,
s-upra note 23, at n.3. Most of the litigation under the ATCA has concerned torture. See BETH STEPHENS &
MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996). See also TORTURE AS
TORT (Craig Scott ed., 2001) (sustained analysis of the potential use of civil remedies to vindicate human rights
norms); Jennifer Green & Paul Hoffman, US Litigation Update, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 231-249 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) (survey of recent
litigation against TNCs under the ATCA).
74. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
75. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 XVL 31063976, at *15 (9th Cir. 2002). To read the ATCA "as
essentially a jurisdictional grant only and then looking to a domestic tort law to provide the cause of action
mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety
municipal tort." Id. (emphasis in original). Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995).
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"allege a violation of 'specific, universal, and obligatory' international norms as part of an
ATCA claim."
7 6
The principal obstacle to suit against private actors such as TNCs is the requirement
that the conduct alleged constitutes a violation of the law of nations-a body of norms
primarily addressed to state conduct. Two threshold questions arise in any ATCA claim
against a private party. The first question is whether the alleged tort is a violation of the
law of nations. In many allegations of human rights abuses, the conduct complained of,
such as torture, murder, slavery, and forced labor, is ajus cogens violation--one of the per-
emptory norms of international law binding on states without proof of their consent."
While a jus cogens violation is sufficient, it is not a necessary requirement for an ATCA
claim, which may also be satisfied by proof of violation of other international law norms.7 8
The second threshold question is whether the private party is engaged in state action in
committing the tort and, if not, whether the absence of any color of state authority is a bar
to suit in the case. While most conduct that violates international norms requires state
action for ATCA liability, "there are a 'handful of crimes,' including slave trading, 'to which
the law of nations attributes individual liability,' such that state action is not required." 9
Purely private action that violates international norms imposing individual liability satisfies
the ATCA. ATCA liability may also arise where a nonstate actor violates international law
through acts to which international law does not attribute individual criminal responsibility
but where those acts are committed in pursuit of an act which itself attracts individual
responsibility under international law. Thus, in Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit noted
that genocide and war crimes attracted individual criminal responsibility under international
law so that an ATCA suit might be brought against private parties for such conduct without
any color of state action or authority. The court also held that ATCA liability would arise
from crimes such as rape, torture, and summary execution, which require state action for
liability under international law, when they are committed in furtherance of another crime
(such as genocide and war crimes), which does not require state action for international
responsibility and ATCA liability.80 Finally, ATCA liability of private parties may arise in-
dependently for complicity in state action that violates international law.
These elements of ATCA liability were applied in Doe I v. Unocal Corp. where four Myan-
mar villagers sued the U.S.-based resources corporation Unocal and its French joint ven-
turer Total for aiding and abetting the forced labor, murder, rape and torture inflicted on
them by the military junta in control of Myanmar in the course of construction of a gas
pipeline through their region. In September 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's award of summary judgment for Unocal
and dismissal of the claims under the ATCA. The court held that forced labor is a modern
variant of slavery to which the law of nations attributes individual liability to nonstate actors.
The court applied the standard for aiding and abetting under the ATCA as "knowing prac-
76. Papa v. United States, 181 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
77. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1992).
78. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *9.
79. Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards J.
concurring)). In Unocal, the court included forced labor in this group of crimes. Id. at *10-12.
80. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); Unocal Corp.,
2002 WL 31063976, at *9-10.
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tical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime" that is made with "actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge that the ac-
complice's actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.""' It also held
that a reasonable factfinder could find that Unocal's conduct met this standard. In relation
to the allegations of murder, rape, and torture, no requirement of state conduct applied
under the ATCA in view of the plaintiffs' testimony that the alleged acts occurred in
furtherance of forced labor. The court held that the record disclosed genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Unocal's conduct satisfied the standard for aiding and abetting
murder and rape, but not torture. If allowed to stand, the decision has enormous significance
for TNC accountability for complicity in host government violation of international human
rights standards. 2 However, in February 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ordered that the case be reheard by the en banc court and that the three-judge panel opinion
of September 2002 not be cited as precedent except to the extent adopted by the en banc
court."5
B. LIMITATIONS UPON CIVIL LITIGATION AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY
MECHANISM
What is the overall utility of the ATCA remedy as a mechanism for setting standards
governing international business operations? On the one hand, the remedy potentially de-
fines the "primitive minimum beneath which the market will not operate;" its base standard
of liability may indeed have stimulated some of the voluntary sector initiatives that have
proliferated over the past decade.M However, the remedy also has major limitations as a
standard-setting device and a guide to corporate conduct.
The first limitation is simply the narrow scope of its reach beyond state action. Since the
remedy lies only for a breach of the law of nations, corporate conduct will be actionable
only: where it constitutes one of the handful of crimes that impose liability upon private
actors; where it involves other breaches of international law committed in furtherance of a
such a crime; or where it involves complicity with state action that itself breaches inter-
national law. 5 Beyond the egregious conduct that attracts individual criminal liability under
international law (or furthers such conduct), TNCs are effectively sanctioned under the
ATCA only in relation to action undertaken on behalf of or in complicity with host
governments.
81. Unocal Corp. 2002 WL 31063976, at *12, 22. The District Court had granted the motion for summary
judgment on the forced labor claims on the basis of a legal standard of "active participation," which the plaintiffs
had not established. Id. at *6. The Court of Appeals reserved for later consideration (since other forms of
assistance were evident on the record) whether merely moral support that has the required substantial effect
satisfies the complicity standard. Id. at *19.
82. Unlike most of the individual, non-corporate defendants in the ATCA litigation, the corporate defen-
dants have significant assets that are answerable for any judgment from the trial of the action. Their major
stake, however, is their reputational capital at risk. The successful plaintiffs in Filirtiga and Kadic recovered
no payment from the compensation awarded by the courts.
83. 2003 U.S. App. LFXIS 2716; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 1388 (Feb. 14, 2003).
84. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Litigating Corporate Responsibility (Global Dimensions Seminar, Human Rights and
Corporate Responsibility, June 2001, New York), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/global-
Dimensions/seminars/humanRightsAndCorporateResponsibility/steinhardtTranscript.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2003). See infra text accompanying notes 107-108.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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Second, the scope of the remedy under the ATCA is affected by jurisdictional rules
and principles of corporate law whose cumulative effect is to restrict legal action against
individual members of a corporate group. International business is typically organized
through a legal structure of separate corporations for distinct operations, whether on a
geographical or functional basis.8 6 While the corporate group may be a single enterprise
in economic or business terms, that is not the legal characterization of the group, absent
special circumstances, each member of the group is a distinct legal entity"7 deriving its
nationality from the nation state in which it is incorporated.8 8 The combined effect of
these rules upon actions under the ATCA is likely to be (1) to limit the exercise of juris-
diction in actions against foreign parents even if they have wholly owned subsidiaries that
are incorporated in the United States, and (2) to insulate the U.S. parent from liability
with respect to the operations of a foreign affiliate, which affiliate would not normally be
amenable to U.S. jurisdiction for the alleged violation. The result is to limit ATCA's
reach to actions against U.S. TNCs which are the parent entities of corporate groups
that are tightly integrated operationally. If these conclusions are well founded, the ATCA
remedy is likely to play only a modest role in relation to TNC accountability. Accordingly,
they require careful justification.
Consider first the potential amenability of foreign parent corporations to U.S. jurisdic-
tion. In the Unocal litigation, the ATCA action against Unocal's French joint venturer,
Total, S.A, was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction. Total had no contacts of its own
with the United States beyond the listing of stock on U.S. exchanges and promotion of
sales of that stock. The Ninth Circuit held that this by itself was insufficient to sustain
personal jurisdiction against Total. 9 However, in another ATCA action alleging foreign
human rights violations, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction against foreign TNCs based on the fact that they maintained an investor
relations office in the forum to facilitate the foreign parents' relations with the local in-
vestment community. The office fielded inquiries, mailed information, and organized meet-
ings across the United States for parent company officials, investors and financial analysts.
The activities of the office were sufficient to satisfy the requirements for general jurisdiction
through the defendant's "continuous and systematic general business contacts."9 The scale
of activity undertaken to promote the parent's stock is significant for the latter's amenability
to personal jurisdiction.
Total's only remaining contacts with the U.S. forum were through the activities of
its California incorporated subsidiaries and its other U.S. subsidiaries with contacts
86. See UNCTAD, supra note 1 (for figures on parent corporations and foreign affiliates). The corporate
structure may be augmented by newer forms of network or other long-term association. See supra text accom-
panying note 44.
87. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW
CORPORATE PERSoNALrry 3-5 (Oxford University Press 1993); Blumberg, supra note 67.
88. The Barcelona Traction Co., (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 I.CJ. 3.
89. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a court may exercise jurisdiction over any defendant "who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(a). The Ninth
Circuit has adopted a three-part test to determine the availability of personal jurisdiction against a non-resident
defendant: (1) the defendant must do some act or transaction within the forum by which he "purposefully avails
himself of the privileges of doing business in the forum"; (2) the claim must arise out of the defendant's forum
related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 923-25.
90. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2000).
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there. 9 The court held that mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship was insuf-
ficient to establish jurisdiction over the parent on the basis of the subsidiary's contacts with
the forum.92 Those contacts may be attributed to the foreign parent only when the subsid-
iary had become either the alter ego or agent of the parent. This would typically occur
where the parent has assumed "control of the subsidiary's internal affairs or daily opera-
tions."93 To establish the alter ego exception, it needs to be shown "(1) that there is such
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer
exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate identities] would result in fraud or
injustice." 94 The court noted an alternative statement of the first limb as requiring a "show-
ing that the parent controls the subsidiary 'to such a degree as to render the latter the mere
instrumentality of the former."'95 What degree of engagement by the parent in subsidiary
affairs will satisfy the standard? The Supreme Court in United States v. Best oods recently
affirmed that a parent may be directly involved in the activities of its subsidiaries without
incurring liability for the subsidiary's acts so long as that involvement is "consistent with
the parent's investor status." 96 Appropriate parental involvement includes "monitoring of
the subsidiary's performance, supervision of the subsidiary's finance and capital budget
decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures." 97 In Doe v. Unocal Corp. the
plaintiffs argued that Total was the alter ego of its U.S. subsidiaries on the basis of its
involvement in their acquisitions, divestments and capital expenditures, formulation of gen-
eral business policies and strategies applicable to them, the provision of loans and other
financing, the existence of overlapping directors and officers with the subsidiaries, and the
undercapitalization of the subsidiaries. The Ninth Circuit court, however, held that the
subsidiaries were adequately capitalized for their current operations, that the loans were
interest-bearing and properly documented, and that Total's financing and macro-
management of its subsidiaries did not go beyond the role of an "active parent corporation
involved directly in decision-making about its subsidiaries' holdings." 9 This limited role
did not make the subsidiaries an alter ego of the parent corporation.
Similarly, the agency test for attribution of contacts for purposes of the assertion of
personal jurisdiction against Total was not satisfied. The agency standard for piercing the
corporate veil is conceptually distinct from the common law doctrine of agency.99 It requires
proof that "the subsidiary functions as the parent corporation's representative in that it
performs services that are 'sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did
not have a representative to perform them, the corporation's own officials would undertake
to perform substantially similar services."' "° The Ninth Circuit held that there was no
91. It appears that none of these subsidiaries was involved in the operations in Myanmar.
92. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 925.
93. Id. at 926.
94. Id. (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Campagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.1996)).
95. Id. (quoting Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F.Supp. 674, 678 (E.D. Cal. 1995)).
96. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). The case concerned whether the parent bore derivative
liability for environmental cleanup in respect of the subsidiary's activities.
97. Id.
98. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 927-28. Reference to the subsidiaries in Total's annual report as "divisions"
of the parent did not affect this conclusion.
99. The agency ground for veil piercing is not universally accepted, and is principally applied in the Ninth
Circuit and New York. Blumberg, supra note 67, at 499.
100. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 928 (quoting Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1405 (9th
Cir.1994)). If so, the subsidiary functions as "merely the incorporated department of its parent." Id. (quoting
Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079, 1083-84 (E.D. Pa. 1992)).
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evidence that Total would perform the activities of its U.S. subsidiaries if they were un-
available.'°'
Foreign affiliates are even less likely to be amenable to U.S. jurisdiction in respect to
conduct by their parent or affiliate since they will usually lack the degree of control over
them that might engage alter ego or agency doctrines. In view of the jurisdictional obstacles
to suit against foreign subsidiaries, action under the ATCA is more commonly taken against
the U.S. incorporated parent.0 2 The parent is amenable to jurisdiction in its country of
incorporation and where it conducts business.3 However, its liability in respect of the acts
of a foreign affiliate depends upon its participation in the alleged violation or attribution
to it of the alleged acts of the foreign affiliate under veil piercing doctrines. In Doe I v.
Unocal Corp., the plaintiffs succeeded in establishing sufficient evidence of the participation
by the U. S. parent in the alleged breach of international law to allow trial of the action.
Significantly for present purposes, the Ninth Circuit also held that there was sufficient
evidence to justify the conclusion that Unocal's two wholly-owned Myanmar subsidiaries
were its alter ego so that their actions were attributable to it. That evidence included the
undercapitalization of the subsidiaries and the direct involvement of senior officers of the
parent in the subsidiaries' operations.1 4 The resolution of veil piercing issues is always fact
intensive and there are wider leeways for judicial choice in legal and factual characterization
than in many other legal issues. It remains the case, however, that an ATCA claim has yet
to succeed against a corporate defendant that has gone to trial upon its merits.
This analysis indicates that ATCA's probable reach to foreign TNCs is heavily circum-
scribed. Further, where allegations are made against a foreign affiliate of a U.S. parent, in
the absence special circumstances that warrant piercing the corporate veil, neither the for-
eign affiliate nor its parent may be liable under an ATCA action-the former for want of
jurisdiction and the latter for want of attribution to it of the affiliate's acts. The ATCA's
reach to TNCs may be narrow, possibly limited to U.S. incorporated parents of transna-
tional groups. These are not the only, or even the major, national cluster of transnational
groups.105
In any event, there is a normative concern as to whether it is appropriate that the task
of elaborating and enforcing a body of international legal norms governing TNC operations
should fall to the courts of a single nation state. Although there is a basis in national self-
interest for the assertion of national jurisdiction to secure compliance with international
law,'6 international legal norms ultimately depend for their legitimacy upon the partici-
pation, if not consent, of the international community, including perhaps in this domain
affected private actors. The ATCA litigation is an inappropriate long-term vehicle for the
101. Id. at 929.
102. Blumberg, s-upra note 67, at 500, n.35.
103. This is so even if the U.S. parent has its principal place of business abroad. Blumberg, supra note 67,
at 500, n.22 (citing Torres v. S. Peru Copper Co., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997)).
104. Id. at 1422, n.30. As with other elements of this decision, its authority is suspended pending rehearing
by the en banc court. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 1388 (Feb. 14, 2003).
105. Thus, in UNCTAD's transnationality index, ranking TNCs by the proportion of foreign to domestic
sales, assets and employment, eight of the top ten TNCs are European and the remaining two Canadian
(Seagram Co. and Thomson Corp. were ranked first and third, respectively). UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT i999: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE
CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 82-4 (1999).
106. Steinhardt, supra note 84.
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development of international legal norms governing TNC operations because of the limited
scope of its reach as to breach and offender. Indeed, it has been argued that the ATCA
litigation might undermine development of a truly international regime for TNCs since it
imposes a U.S.-centered view, one refracted through the prism of U. S. constitutional law
and interpretative practice.
07
IV. Market Based Strategies: the Privatization of Corporate
Responsibility
The second regime for human rights protection is through voluntary initiatives by cor-
porations, industry associations, and other groups publicly adopting principles for the con-
duct of international business. These initiatives are intended to demonstrate a commitment
to standards with respect to human rights observance and other social conduct beyond the
letter of legal obligation. They represent a form of "human rights entrepreneurialism"-
efforts by corporations to compete for consumers or investors by means of signalled respect
for human rights standards in company operations. 08 These private initiatives emerged in
the late 1980s with the contraction of state regulatory functions and the liberalization of
trade and investment regimes. Their principal expression is through codes of conduct and
statements of business principles addressing labor, environmental, and other social con-
cerns. They rely upon the voluntary assumption of corporate responsibility and self-
regulation, sometimes with external monitoring and verification. These self-regulatory ini-
tiatives are currently the primary focus for development of norms of corporate
responsibility, the ascendant corporate strategy for human rights protection, and a major
focus of civil society advocacy.109
A. THE FORMS AND CONTENT OF CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
The first significant appearance of voluntary codes dealing with human rights was in
the late 1980s among U.S.-based clothing manufacturers and retailers." 0 It followed their
107. Ratner, supra note 13, at 450-53 (although it strengthens accountability against international standards,
the ATCA jurisprudence is not developed and shared by the international community as such norms should
be).
108. Steinhardt, supra note 84. A parallel voluntary initiative is that of social labelling-the communication
of information about the social conditions in which a product was produced through a physical label, usually
attached to a product or displayed at the point of sale.
109. Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'I L.J. 1963
(1996); Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES
TO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS AND A RESOURCE GUIDE (prepared and published by the Non-
Government Liaison Service of the United Nations), available at http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/documents/
publications.en/develop.dossier/dd.07 % 20(csr)/lcontents.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2003); Peter Utting, Reg-
ulating Business via Multistakeholder Initiatives: A Preliminary Assessment, in VOLuNTARY APPROACHES TO
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS AND A RESOURCE GUIDE (prepared and published by the Non-
Government Liaison Service of the United Nations), available at http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/documents/
publications.endevelop.dossier/dd.07%20(csr)/lcontents.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). Other market re-
sponses including the growth of socially responsive investing, shareholder proposals, social reporting and
auditing movement, pressures from lenders concerned about their own potential liability, for example, for
environmental cleanup, and from international financial institutions attaching human rights conditionality to
financial provision. See Williams, supra note 32, and supra note 33.
110. Earlier waves of voluntary human rights codes appeared from the 1970s addressed to apartheid policies
in South Africa, employment discrimination in Northern Ireland, and bribery and corrupt payments.
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adoption of international production methods through external contractors and suppliers.
With increased civil society pressure for enterprise accountability, international firms felt
exposed to the labor practices of their foreign business partners in the commodity or service
chain. In some instances, codes were adopted in direct response to incidents attracting
negative publicity in relation to human rights or environmental performance. I ' The higher
the public profile of a corporation and its products, the greater is its vulnerability to adverse
publicity and consumer sentiment; small firms are therefore less likely to adopt codes of
conduct because of their lower public visibility and greater use of domestic production.
This vulnerability of many large firms also reflects the high valuations placed upon intan-
gible assets represented by branded products and services in their financial statements." 2
Code adoption also reflects heightened public expectations that business will accept re-
sponsibility for the social impacts of operations.
Codes take several forms. The earliest were individual company codes, adopted on the
firm's own initiative; they remain the most numerous group of codes, representing 48
percent of codes in an inventory taken by the OECD of codes adopted by corporations
based in member countries."' Individual company codes in the inventory were almost
equally divided between those containing guidelines for the conduct of suppliers and busi-
ness partners, a statement of the company's commitments to the public, and guidelines for
the company's employees."l4 The next most numerous group (37 percent of the inventory)
were the codes issued by industry and trade associations reflecting a negotiated consensus
among member firms in a particular industry; these comprise codes adopted by associations
in both developed and developing countries. "' Multistakeholder codes, adopted following
consultation among those with an interest in a particular industry such as trade unions and
NGOs as well as corporations and their industry associations, 16 represented 13 percent
of the inventory, and codes developed by international organizations represented a mere
Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What can the Sullivan and MacBride
Principles Tell Us? 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 167 (1999). These codes were dismantled as these issues were
overtaken by exogenous events. The modern phenomenon of private codes of conduct had emerged with
industry codes on advertising and marketing practices developed by the International Chamber of Commerce
in the late 1930s. See Jenkins, supra note 109.
Il1. Thus, for Shell in Nigeria, BP in Colombia, and Rio Tinto in Papua New Guinea, the incentive for
codes lay in "reputational disaster" in particular incidents. Chandler, supra note 11, at 43-44.
112. Jenkins, supra note 109.
113. OECD, CODES OF CONDUCT-Ai EXPANDED REVIEW OF THEIR CONTENTS (VORKING PARTY OF THE
TRADE COMMITT-EE, TDfTC/WP(99)56/FINAL), Fig. 1.
114. Id. Fig. 2. Some codes fell into two categories.
115. Developed country codes include the PARTNERS AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE CHILD LABOUR IN THE
SOCCER BALL INDUSTRY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF Toy INDUSTRIES; developing country codes in-
clude the codes issued by the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association and the Kenya
Flower Council.
116. See, e.g., Fair Labor Association (partnership between apparel and footwear corporations, human rights
NGOs, and unions and consumer groups to govern labour standards in international garment and footwear
production), available at http://www.fairlabor.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2003); Ethical Trading Initiative Base
Code (promotion of good practice in codes of labour standards), available at http://www.eti.org.uk/pub/
publications/basecode/en/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). The Fair Labor Association (formerly called
White House Apparel Industry Parmership) and the Ethical Trade Initiative were promoted by the U.S. and
U.K. governments, respectively.
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2 percent."' Finally, there are numerous model agreements usually developed by civil so-
ciety organizations as benchmarks or frameworks for individual or industry codes."18
Since there is no systematic reporting of corporate codes, precise information is not
available as to their incidence and content. However, the OECD inventory of codes reveals
a high level of concentration in particular sectors. More than half of the corporations with
individual codes were involved in trade; the next most numerous sectors were textiles and
chemicals (each 19 percent) and extractive industries (17 percent).1 9 Labor relations and
environmental stewardship were the most common broad areas covered in the codes: 60
percent of codes surveyed referred to labor standards and 59 percent to environmental
stewardship; the other principal areas covered were consumer protection (47 percent), brib-
ery (23 percent), competition (20 percent), and information disclosure (18 percent). 20 Of
the codes addressing labor standards, 25 percent referred to "human rights" in addition to
specific issues such as prohibitions upon forced labor, discrimination, and harassment;' 2'141
percent referred to obligations upon sub-contractors and other business partners.'
When a code addresses a company's own business practices, its effectiveness depends
upon whether its commitments are put into practice; such implementation can be reliably
assessed only by an independent monitor. A survey of major U.S. textile firms by the De-
partment of Labor found that most of their codes did not contain detailed provisions for
monitoring and implementation and that many did not have a reliable monitoring system
in place.2' Of the company codes in the OECD inventory that made commitments about
the company's own behaviour, external monitoring is the least used implementation tech-
nique with only 2 percent of codes referring to it. In contrast, 23 percent of the codes
addressed to suppliers provided for external monitoring although the incidence of actual
use is not known.24 Fewer than half of the codes in the OECD inventory referred to
117. The principal instances are the ILO TRIPARTITE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/
sources/mne.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) and the OECD GUIDELINES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE,
available at http://www.itcilo.itlenglish/actrav/telearm/globallilo/guide/oecd.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
Since these two codes have their own interpretative mechanism, they are considered separately under inter-
national cooperation arrangements. See infra text accompanying notes 160-168.
118. Examples range from the U.S. Dept of Commerce's MODEL BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, 1995, to the more
elaborate models issued by NGOs, such as Amnesty International's HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES FOR COMPANIES
(1998).
119. OECD, supra note 113, Table 2.
120. Id. Fig. 3.
121. Id. Table 2.
122. Id. at 12. Often partners were asked to sign a letter of understanding acknowledging that there might
be sanctions if the standard is not adhered to. Id. at 13. For code issues in the apparel industry (mostly retailers),
almost all of the codes were addressed to suppliers and contractors. Id. at 24.
123. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE APPAREL INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL CHILD LABOR PROBLEM? 99-108 (1996), available at http://ww.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/
apparel/main.htrn. The report found that "[wihile monitoring for product quality . . . is customary in the
garment industry ... monitoring for compliance with provisions in codes of conduct ... dealing with other
labor standards-and child labor in particular-is not." Id. at 120. Where monitoring occurs, there is "relatively
little interaction" between the monitors and workers and the local community. Id. The report indicated that
such monitors tend to have technical background in production and quality control and "are relativelyuntrained
with regard to implementation of labor standards." Id. at 126.
124. OECD,supra note 113, at 37, 39. Three-quarters of supplier codes provide for punitive action for non-
observance.
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sanctions for breach, assessment of performance or "active" internal monitoring, or pro-
vided for reporting on performance or a channel to report concerns. 25
B. THE STRENGTHS OF CODES OF CONDUCT AS HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION INSTRUMENTS
Codes of conduct have distinct advantages as a strategy for achieving corporate obser-
vance of human rights standards. First, while their voluntary nature provides weaker pro-
tection relative to legally binding norms, they minimize the need for the precision in ex-
pression that might otherwise be an insuperable obstacle to negotiation of a formal
multilateral instrument. Such precision might later be achieved through understanding
based upon experience. Voluntary codes are most influential when they enjoy wide support
within an industry; they may then enjoy a moral and political force that has a major influence
on practice.
12 6
Second, although private codes are not backed by legally enforceable sanction, they are
underpinned by the reputational investment made with their adoption that investment rests
upon the public commitment made through the code. By adopting a code of conduct, a
company creates a point of leverage against itself if the gap between declared standards and
its own practice widens too appreciably. Similarly, the mere adoption of a code subjects the
company to scrutiny against more exacting standards contained in model codes or those of
competitors. These incentives are significant for those firms whose brands, products or
services trade in public markets and who are vulnerable to negative consumer sentiment.
For publicly held corporations, there is the further prospect of shareholder reaction to
ethically dubious conduct. These sanctions are also supported by the threat of media ex-
posure. In that sense, these so-called voluntary codes are not wholly discretionary since
they may be sanctioned in varying measures by media, consumer, and investor pressure.
Third, codes effectively create a web of transnational obligation that operates indepen-
dently of host (and home) state consent. Thus, where a northern retailer sourcing produc-
tion from southern suppliers introduces a code of conduct that incorporates ILO labor
standards, through its contractual sanctions of termination for non-compliance, it effec-
tively extends the reach of the international standards to the suppliers' operations even
though the host states may have declined to ratify the standards or enforce then.'2 7
Fourth, relative to alternative strategies such as prescriptive international instruments
(which might receive limited ratification and only then with significant reservations), vol-
125. Id. Table 6. Data on code content may not, however, be a reliable guide to actual practices with respect
to code implementation since provision may be made independently of the code. Id. at 26. Other studies,
however, report little code provision for monitoring compliance. See Ans Kolk et al., International Codes of
Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility: Can Transinational Corporations Regulate Themselves? 8 TRANSN. CORP.
1 (Apr. 1999) (41 percent of company codes make no specific reference to monitoring of compliance; 44 percent
provide for self-monitoring only; external monitoring mentioned in fewer than 10 percent of company codes
and 5 percent of industry association codes). See also C. Ferguson, A Review of UK Company Codes of Conduct,
Social Development Division, DFID 1998, available at http://www.eldis.org/cf/search/disp/docdis-
play.cftndoc = DOC6258&resource = flcsr (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) (U.K. company codes studied made no
reference to systematic monitoring and independent verification).
126. Indeed, the process of formal international law making may start with such codes through expectations
which they create as to appropriate labor and social standards. Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, in LEtGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ErTER-
POISES 3 (Norbert Horn ed., 198o).
127. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 45 (UNCTAD/
ITE/IT/22, 2001).
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untary codes have the singular advantage of feasibility of achievement. In theory at least,
they also offer the opportunity to effect practical change at the operating level and to do
so quickly. Of course, a company will adopt a code only when it sees advantage in doing
so. However, this voluntary character and the reputational investment made in the code
theoretically provide greater incentive and capacity for internalization in corporate practice
and culture than externally imposed norms. Through these measures, a code has the po-
tential to create living norms and not simply those "in the books."
C. OPERATIONAL WEAKNESSES IN CODES AS Hum.AN RIGHTS ASSURANCE MECHANISMS
The economic and social significance of private initiatives such as codes of conduct de-
pends upon the relative importance of the firms that adopt them and the extent to which
the commitments made are put into practice. There is clear evidence that codes have serious
weaknesses that undermine their utility as human rights assurance measures. One group of
weaknesses arises from their practical operation and a second from characteristics inherent
in the code device itself. The following looks at these two species of weakness separately.
The present wave of corporate codes emerged with the liberalization of international
trade and investment. It is no surprise then that they are highly concentrated in the trade
sector, particularly among northern retailers of consumer goods with high brand recogni-
tion and low production costs. 2 ' The publicity attaching to code adoption by industry
leaders tends to obscure the reality that the proportion of firms adopting codes is relatively
low; however, most TNCs have not adopted a human rights or labor code, maintaining
simply that they obey the law of the countries where they do business. 1 9
Second, the codes adopted are predominantly unilateral in character in that five out of
every six codes in the OECD inventory are either individual company or industry codes. 30
This unilateralism is reflected in the skewing of code content in the interest of the individual
firm or industry. Since code adoption appears to be driven by perceived consumer senti-
ment, codes are often narrowly focused upon issues judged to be either key points of market
vulnerability or advantage. Accordingly, codes focus upon issues with a high profile in
developed country markets (e.g., the use of child labor); different priorities might emerge
from multistakeholder analysis of human rights impacts of business operations. 131 Code
content is also highly variable even within narrowly defined areas, and there are significant
gaps in coverage. Thus, among the labor codes in the OECD inventory, a majority of codes
included only one of the four core labor standards identified by the OECD from ILO and
UN conventions-the prohibition upon discrimination and harassment in employment.31
128. See supra text accompanying note I 1.
129. Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrre, Enforcing International Labor Rights through Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 686 (1995). A survey of 150 U.S. TNCs operating in sectors
deemed likely to have supplier codes found that only twenty-five had human rights codes. Cassel, supra note
108. Another survey reported that roughly 10 percent has overseas human rights guidelines. CRAIO FORCESE,
COMMERCE WITH CONSCIENCE?: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUcr 20 (1997).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
131. Jenkins, supra note 109 (tendency for codes to focus on particular issues regarded as highly damaging
for companies to be associated with); Avery, supra note 31, at 57-58 (most corporate codes that refer to human
rights take a minimalist approach, referring only to issues for which their industry has been criticized).
132. OECD, supra note 113, Table 4. The other core labor standards are the prohibitions upon child and
forced labor and the rights of free association and to organize and bargain collectively. OECD, TRADE, EM-
PLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 42
(COM/DEELSA/TD(96)8/FINAL, 1996).
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The only other issues addressed in a majority of the OECD codes were provision of a
reasonable working environment and compliance with local laws. Fewer than half of the
codes mention other fundamental concerns in international standards such as prohibitions
upon child and forced labor, freedom of association, working hours, wages, the obligations
of contractors and suppliers, monitoring, and training. Only one in four made specific
mention of human rights.'" These omissions point to the need for an integrating mecha-
nism to resolve what constitutes proper conduct and the appropriate social and labor stan-
dards in international production.
The potential significance of a code for an individual TNC is the commitment the cor-
poration thereby makes to ethical behaviour through the standards of conduct it expresses
and the capacity for internalization into conduct, values, and culture at all levels of the
group. 134 Effective implementation of corporate codes requires dissemination within the
corporation and among stakeholders. It also requires accountability mechanisms within
the corporation, including systems for identifying and sanctioning violations and improving
compliance across the corporation; in the case of TNCs, this means the myriad companies
and divisions within an international group, their contractors, and suppliers. The integrity
and credibility of voluntary codes also depends upon monitoring and verification of cor-
porate compliance systems, including through periodic independent audits.
There are, however, evident weaknesses in implementation and enforcement of codes,
especially a lack of transparency and endemic conflicts of interest. As noted above, effective
monitoring and verification of compliance with codes is uncommon. 35 Workers employed
by supplier firms are often unaware of the existence of codes adopted by northern retailers
to govern the conditions of their employment. 3 6 Even where the codes are available, work-
ers often have no way of reading the code or reporting non-compliance without facing the
threat of disciplinary action or dismissal'" Its low incidence raises doubts about the prac-
tical effect of codes upon corporate behaviour. 38
A distinct set of problems arises when firms undertake external verification of their code
implementation. First, external verification procedures are inherently complex and there-
fore costly.139 There are concerns therefore that, since those costs make it difficult for small
and medium size firms in developing countries to obtain certification of code compliance,
the effect of requiring certification is to displace these firms from the supply chain in favour
of larger producers.- 4 There are also questions about auditor choice and performance.
133. OECD, supra note 113, Table 4. Similarly, the only issue included in a majority of environmental
stewardship codes was compliance with the law. Id. Table 3.
134. Chandler, supra note 11, at 41 ("Codes have no meaning unless they are translated into action and
unless that action is monitored and audited").
135. See supra text accompanying notes 123-124.
136. Thus, the Department of Labor survey of major U.S. textile firms reported that "only very few re-
spondents indicated that they have tried to ensure that production workers overseas know about their code or
policy by specifically requiring that copies of such a statement be posted. Only three [of forty-two firms] stated
that they unconditionally require contractors to post their code." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 123.
137. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANZATION, WORKING PARTY ON THE SocIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LIBER-
ALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 41, para. 60.
138. Chandler, supra note 11, at 41 ("codes have no meaning unless they are translated into action and unless
that action is monitored and audited").
139. It has been estimated that auditing costs alone under SA8000, one of the most established certification
regimes, amount to approximately $20,000. Utting, supra note 109.
140. Id.
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TNCs generally prefer to appoint global accounting firms as auditors, and human rights
groups prefer to have monitoring done by local civil society organizations.' 4 1 The TNC's
choice of auditor usually prevails despite criticism from advocacy groups that the large
accounting firms lack the experience and skills to interview workers effectively and to assess
factory conditions. There is some evidence to support these claims. 142 There are also en-
demic conflicts of interest in such appointments because the auditors commonly provide
the commissioning firm with other audit, consulting, and business services. Although these
conflicts also beset statutory audits of corporate financial performance, they are further
aggravated in the context of voluntary initiatives because the auditors have no statutory
responsibilities to satisfy in the discharge of the task and are not amenable to the regulatory
oversight that applies to financial audits.
143
Finally, sanctions for code violations can fall disproportionately and unfairly upon the
foreign supplier. Manufacturers and other exporters in developing countries have less reason
to support voluntary codes because they bear the consequences of breach, through remedial
action and sanctions that may result ultimately in loss of markets. They also face multiple
standards under the individual codes of the several TNCs that they supply. Thus, many
southern firms and governments see codes as a threat to development as well as an intrusion
upon local autonomy.'"
D. INHERENT WEAKNESSES IN PRIVATE INITIATIVES
Other weaknesses are inherent in codes themselves as devices to assure human rights
compliance. These weaknesses are arguably more egregious than operational weaknesses.
First, codes are not, of course, legally binding. They are sanctioned by the threat of loss
of brand value through the willingness of consumers to make the conditions of production
a criterion in purchasing decisions. 14 Evidence suggests that consumers are interested in
doing so at least within certain limits so that the threat of effective mobilization of consumer
reaction by civil society organizations is a constant one. The sanction is also highly variable
across sectors and countries so that there is little incentive for code adoption by firms that
do not supply public markets directly.'- For adopting firms, the code is liable to be passed
141. CRAIG FORCESE, PUTTING CONSCIENCE INTO COMMERCE: STRATEGIES FOR MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS Busi-
NESS AS USUAL 27 (1997).
142. See DARA O'RouRKE, MONITORING THE MONITORS: A CRITIQUE OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (PwC)
LABOR MONITORING (2000), available at http://www.web.mit.edu/dorourke/www/PDF/pwc.pdf (last visited
Feb. 3, 2003) (auditors from the world's largest monitors of labor and environmental codes used monitoring
methods that were "significantly flawed" in factory inspections, and failed to note a number of critical workplace
health issues; they relied primarily upon information provided by manager rather than workers; interviews with
workers were "problematic"). O'Rourke concludes that independent monitoring can play a positive role but
only if it is "much more transparent and accountable, includes workers more folly, and can be verified by local
NGOs and workers themselves." Id.
143. However, the code may require them to comply with private accrediting agency standards such as the
Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) labor standards or the Global Reporting Initiative framework for cor-
porate reporting on environmental sustainability and social performance issues.
144. Uting, supra note 109.
145. E.V.K. FitzGerald, Regulating Large International Firms 14, available at http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/
website/document.nsf/240da49ca467a5 3f80256b4f005ef245 / 5750d~dd9a3 73c8d8$IILE/fitzgera.pdf(United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Technology, Business and Society Program Paper No. 5,
2001).
146. See id. at 22.
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over when it is judged unnecessary for brand value assurance or for competitive market
advantage over rivals.' 47 The contest between code compliance and firm profits is not an
equal one. 48 Competition in the marketplace remains the ultimate driver of firm conduct.
Second, the predominantly unilateral character of codes undermines any impulse towards
the development of a consensus view as to the appropriate social, labor and environmental
standards for international business. The proliferation of voluntary codes with diverse con-
tent coordinated only by the individual producer or collective industry interest has the
potential to confuse or misconstrue concepts of corporate responsibility and impede the
development of widely accepted international standards addressing international business. 149
The current diversity of codes, which were not necessarily (if at all) developed by reference
to international standards, strongly points to the need for coordination as to the content
of human rights standards applicable to TNCs.'1 ° The OECD survey indicates that the
market alone, without a coherent international framework, has been ineffective in devel-
oping generally accepted standards that maximize the benefits and prevent the risks of
private human rights initiatives.-5 What is required is a framework that supports the uni-
form application of human rights standards which have been developed through the par-
ticipation of affected parties.
Third, firms who do not adopt codes-and they are the majority-share in the benefits
generated by code adoption such as enhanced industry legitimacy and diversion of pres-
sure for regulation. Code adopters cannot capture those benefits exclusively and are liable
to be undercut by competitors who do not assume the cost burdens of their adoption and
implementation. This free-rider problem is a significant deterrent to code adoption and
implementation.'
Fourth, the code movement with its wellsprings in market incentives exposes the limits
of the market system to advance an agenda of social amelioration. That should not surprise
us because it is not the purpose of corporate activity to do so. There is an endemic conflict
between the goals of corporate profit maximization and those of human rights protection
and social development. Corporate action to advance the latter is likely to aid profit max-
imization only in the long-term and even then at the broad systemic level apart from im-
mediate marketing gains that individual corporations might capture. Human rights obser-
vance is not cost-free and is not necessarily profit-maximizing; many corporations have
prospered under authoritarian regimes that provide assurance against the labor and resource
contingencies of enterprise. The appeal of voluntary codes at the international level reflects
the complexity of international lawmaking and enforcement, especially that directed at
global private actors not easily amenable to national controls. Codes are no substitute at
147. Indeed, there is a danger faced by firms that seek to chart "a proactive course in enacting human and
labor rights protections is that it can never fully satisfy its ideals ... [so that firms] like Levi Strauss, Reebok
and Starbucks that claim to set a higher standard often suffer the perverse result of becoming the targets of
criticism." Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrbre, supra note 129, at 686.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
149. Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights:An Update,
July 2000, available at http://l93.194.138.190/businesupdate.htm. See also INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HuMAN
RIGHTS PoLIcY, supra note 17, at 4 (alone, they are ineffective: "their proliferation is leading to contradictory
or incoherent efforts").
150. See infra text accompanying notes 129-158.
151. Id.
152. Utting, supra note 109.
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the international level for attempts to propose solutions that address the complexity of
international legal ordering. Addressing the problems of voluntary code implementation
will not "provide an adequate substitute for establishing a framework of accountability that
extends across and beyond the corporate body."I"
Finally, these new forms of transnational private governance are undoubtedly a construc-
tive attempt to fill the major gap in regulatory arrangements at the global level.154 There
is a danger, however, in the creation of transnational obligations through private codes that
operate independently of the host state or in the face of its decision not to ratify or enforce
the international standard applied by the code.15 Whether code content is driven by per-
ceptions of consumer sentiment, civil society pressure or unaided corporate judgment, its
legitimacy to determine appropriate levels of social, labor and environmental standards in
host, developing countries is contestable. The power that codes have to extend the reach
of international standards would rest more securely and legitimately if grounded in inter-
national participation and consent: "[s]tandards that are intended to operate internationally
should be multilaterally agreed, monitored and applied through procedures that are them-
selves transparent, accountable and socially responsible."16
E. IDENTIFYING PRESUMPTIVE BENCHMARKS FOR STANDARD-SETTING AND ENFORCEMENT
This examination of the utility of corporate codes is useful in identifying desirable char-
acteristics of an effective system of standard-setting and enforcement for human rights
impacts of international business operations. It indicates that the following are some indic-
ative elements--or presumptive benchmarks perhaps---of an effective body of norms for
TNC conduct and a system for its enforcement.
1. It needs to be universal in scope and application and not confined by sectoral or
geographical area.
2. It needs uniformity in content with variation directed by deliberate choice conditioned
by reference to characteristics of the area and activity being addressed.
3. The terms of the standard should reflect the human rights goals of universality of
standards so that protection does not depend upon accidental characteristics such as
the character of the firm and production (e.g., whether production is for export or
domestic markets, by global or local firms).
4. The production of a human rights standard requires the participation of representa-
tives of all parties who are potentially affected by its terms-private as well as public
actors. The process of producing a standard needs to address difficult and contentious
questions such as concerns that human rights standard-setting may erode the com-
petitive advantage of developing countries in international production and operate as
a form of concealed protectionism.
5. An agreed text is settled of a body of norms addressed to corporations specifying
standards of conduct and giving clear guidance as to business responsibilities in in-
ternational production and operations.
153. SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION: THE NEW ECONOMY OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 211 (2001).
154. Utting, supra note 109.
155. See supra text accompanying note 127.
156. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 127, at 54.
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6. Compliance with these norms should not be at the discretion of the firm so that a
competitive advantage is not secured by avoidance of the norms of responsibility.
Accordingly, an effective sanction is needed together with an enforcement mechanism
that is uniform and transparent in its application.
7. A standardized reporting format needs to be established that is susceptible to inde-
pendent audit or other verification.
These benchmarks point to the need for an international coordination mechanism in-
volving plural actors, perhaps using existing international structures operating in interna-
tional human rights, economic development or trade. The role of international coordina-
tion and oversight needs to be assigned either to an existing institution such as the ILO,
World Trade Organization, U.N. or World Bank, or a new agency solely created for that
purpose. The available options to achieve this end are canvassed in the following section.
V. International Coordination in Standard Setting and
Compliance
The argument for international rules and coordination in their enforcement is that they
help to harmonize rules at a time of weak national regulation through standard-setting and
implementation. The principal international mechanisms are those established by the
OECD and ILO. Proposals that the WTO might play a role in this area, at least in relation
to labor rights, have foundered on the opposition of developing countries. "' This section
measures the OECD, ILO, and other emerging international mechanisms against the pre-
viously identified benchmarks. The stimulus for their creation was an earlier effort at pre-
scriptive international regulation.
A. DRAFT U.N. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
In 1972, Chile complained to the United Nations Economic and Social Council that a
U.S.-based TNC was interfering in its domestic political affairs. In the following year, a
coup d'etat succeeded against the elected government. Following the report of a group of
eminent persons, the United Nations established the Commission on Transnational Cor-
porations in 1975 to produce a draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations.] 5
Developing countries were concerned that the global organization, economic power and
technological capacity of TNCs posed both an economic threat to host states as well as a
potential source of political interference in domestic affairs. On the other hand, capital
exporting states were concerned with the protection of investments from expropriation
and discriminatory treatment. In draft form, the Code dealt with matters such as non-
157. Their concern was that the incorporation of the ILO's core labor standards into VWTO free trade rules
with enforcement through its strong sanctions mechanism would negate the comparative trade advantage
enjoyed by low wage countries. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, para. 4 (Dec. 13,
1996). See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 131 (1999); David M. Trubek et al., Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor Relations:
International Regimes and Transnational Policy Networks, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1187 (2000).
158. This account of the draft code process draws upon the detailed treatment in Peter T. Muchlinski,
Attempts to Extend the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Role of UNCTAD, in LIABILITY OF MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds.,
2000).
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interference in the internal affairs of host countries and inter-governmental relations, as
well as corrupt practices, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, labor stan-
dards, transfer pricing, taxation, technology transfer, anti-competitive behavior, consumer
protection, and environmental protection. It enjoined TNCs to respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms of the countries in which they operated. These principles were to
be implemented through national legislation setting out what TNCs may and may not do.
However, by the 1980s both the political and economic tides turned against those seeking
a strong international code and regulation. The scarcity of investment capital following the
economic downturn that resulted from the debt crisis of the early 1980s meant that most
countries were now more interested in attracting FDI than in controlling it. These com-
petitive pressures for FDI were accentuated by the developments now referred to as glob-
alization.1 9 The impetus for the draft Code had subsided well before the formal suspension
of negotiations in 1992.
B. VOLUNTARY INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISE
The only general code of conduct for international business are the OECD Guidelines
on Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) which form part of its Declaration on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises. 60 The Guidelines were adopted in 1976
with the declared objective of facilitating direct investment among OECD members while
maintaining a clear eye towards establishing the position of the capital exporting states
before the United Nations draft Code of Conduct was settled. The Guidelines are rec-
ommendations addressed by OECD member governments to multinational enterprises
with respect to their business operations. (Most TNCs originate in the OECD states.) The
Guidelines express standards of responsible business conduct by balancing the interests of
foreign investors and host states. Observance of the Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary
and not legally enforceable.
The body of the Guidelines is devoted to specific topics like information disclosure, labor
relations, environment, corruption, consumer protection, science and technology, compe-
tition, and taxation. Their utility arises where national legislation is vague or poorly
drafted. 16 The Guidelines address human rights obligations only obliquely. Under the
heading "General Policies," enterprises are enjoined, inter alia, to "respect the human rights
of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government's international
obligations and commitments; contribute to economic, social and environmental progress
159. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
160. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.state.gov/www/issues/
economic/oecd-guidelines.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. The Declaration
is primarily concerned with the protection of investment. Its other elements are a commitment to national
treatment (treatment of enterprises of other OECD member states no less favorably than domestic enterprises),
the harmonization of conflicting requirements on TNCs and cooperation in direct investment between member
states.
161. In their original form the OECD Guidelines did not refer to two of the four ILO core labor standards,
presumably on the grounds that it was unthinkable that leading companies would condone the use of child or
forced labor. The emergence of heightened competition and international production methods under global-
ization, however, made such explicit reference necessary. Kari Tapiola, UN Global Compact and otber ILO
Instruments 2 (OECD Roundtable on Global Instruments for Corporate Responsibility,June 19, 2001),available
at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/MOOOI8000/M00018066.pdf.
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with a view to achieving sustainable development... and abstain from any improper in-
volvement in local political activities. '1 62 The Guidelines do not elaborate a body of norms
that specify standards of TNC responsibility; instead, they seek to reinforce the capacity of
host governments to enforce human rights standards against TNCs by this general injunc-
tion. A proposal that clauses be added to specify human rights obligations was rejected on
the grounds that it might create doubts as to the primary responsibility of governments to
uphold those rights. 161
National Contact Points (NCPs) have been established to promote the OECD Guide-
lines and their implementation. NCPs provide a forum for discussion of the Guidelines and
informal assistance with problems that arise with their application. However, NCPs do not
have formal dispute resolution powers; their role is simply to facilitate and promote the
Guidelines rather than to execute them or to adjudicate disputes that arise from their local
application. Authority to interpret the Guidelines rests with the Committee on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises. The committee, however, does not make
a judgment as to whether a corporation has breached the Guidelines in a particular case
but instead issues a clarification as to the meaning of the Guidelines, expressed in general
terms only. Moreover, it does not disclose publicly the identity of corporations against
whom complaints are made. There is, accordingly, no capacity under the Guidelines to
sanction individual corporations even through soft measures such as public naming or dec-
larations of breach. A trade union organization brought a series of complaints that resulted
in more than forty clarifications by the end of the 1980s, many of which supported labor
rights. But when there was no implementation of the clarifications at the national level, use
of the complaints process declined in the 1990s.1M
The ILO Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy was adopted by the
ILO Governing Body in 1977. For some time, there was a widely held expectation that it
would ultimately become the "social chapter" of the U.N. Code of Conduct for TNCs.
When the code failed to materialize, so too did the political will within the ILO to upgrade
the Declaration to a Convention or Recommendation of the International Labour Con-
ference. 6 The result was a voluntary set of recommendations similar to the OECD Guide-
lines although limited to labor conditions. There is a procedure permitting workers' and
employers' organizations to bring requests for interpretation in specific cases. However, the
confidential procedure is rarely used because it does not judge the conduct of individual
corporations or provide a remedy for those affected.- 6 Like the OECD Guidelines, the
ILO Declaration defers to national practice and therefore fails to create a truly international
framework.
162. OECD Guidelines, supra note 160.
163. Jan Huner, The Multinational Agreement on Investment and the Review of the OECD Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprises, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 203-4
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
164. INTrERNATIONtAL COUNCIL ON HuMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 17, at 101. When Renault closed its
Belgian assembly plant in 1997 without reasonable notice to employees, the joint request for clarification by
Belgium and France was "largely symbolic." Huner, supra note 163, at 201-02.
165. Tapiola, supra note 161.
166. Only twenty-three requests for interpretation have been made since the procedure began in 1986; "only
a handful" resulted in an interpretation. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 17,
at 102-03.
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The OECD and ILO procedures fall short of the benchmarks identified in significant
respects. The OECD Guidelines lack clarity and specificity in that both sets of standards
are voluntary and effectively unsanctioned except in the most egregious instances; and
monitoring and independent verification of compliance is non-existent and would be dif-
ficult in any event in view of the general terms in which the human rights provisions are
expressed. 167 Although lack of transparency in the operation of both systems prevents con-
fident assessment of their impact, they appear to provide little guidance to TNCs as to the
content and scope of their responsibilities for human rights protection outside the sphere
of labor standards (in the case of the ILO Declaration). There is little reason to think that
they moderate TNC behavior in any human rights domain.' 6s They are perhaps a staging
post on the road to an effective international system offering clear and sanctioned norms
of responsible TNC conduct.
C. OTHER OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATION
There are several mechanisms that might be adopted to secure international regulation
of TNC activity, ranging from a legally binding instrument and a legal regime of interna-
tional corporate responsibility to a variety of soft law arrangements. One developing model
holds particular prospect of providing an international standard that draws upon accumu-
lated experience with corporate codes and soft law instruments.
The most obvious option is for an international treaty or other instrument to regulate
TNC activity, with direct enforcement through an international tribunal empowered with
civil and perhaps criminal sanctions or through existing U.N. agencies using informal sanc-
tions such as public naming against TNCs that breach the treaty. TNCs would not ordi-
narily be parties to the instrument; the jurisdiction to sanction would arise from the consent
of host and home nations that have assented to the instrument. Of course, binding inter-
national instruments have advantages over other options through their assurance of the
prospect of uniform sanctioned standards of TNC responsibility. This would offer a cor-
rective means to power imbalances in bilateral negotiations between TNCs and potential
hosts in the competitive environment for mobile investment capital. There are, however,
powerful considerations weighing against legally binding norms governing TNC conduct
with the most obvious being the improbability of such a code attracting significant support
from developed states, at least without significant reservations. It is unrealistic to expect
that human rights standards for TNCs would be promulgated as a legally binding instru-
ment without a lengthy process of prior consensus building and a period with intermediate
status as soft law guidelines for action.
Although he does not commit to a model involving legally binding international norms,
Steven Ratner proposes a theory of corporate responsibility for human rights protection
through the direct imposition of obligations upon corporations. In this model of enterprise
liability, the content of the obligation upon the TNC at international law would depend
upon four "clusters of issues": the closeness of the corporation's relationship with the host
government; its nexus to affected populations (i.e., whether special associative ties exist);
167. Such as the action taken by the ILO in response to allegations of the use by TNCs of forced labor in
Myanmar.
168. Cf INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 17, at 161 ("these largely dormant
procedures ... have so far failed to make a significant impact").
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the particular human right at issue (corporations having different responsibilities to gov-
ernments, there is a need for balance between business and individual interests); and the
place of individuals violating human rights within the enterprise structure or their rela-
tionship with it if not employees (e.g., as contractors, co-venturers and agents).169 These
criteria would result in two broad types of duties on TNCs; namely complicity-based duties
and duties not to infringe directly on human rights of those with whom it enjoys certain
ties. These criteria provide a starting point from which to develop a body of norms that
might be implemented through either of several modes including voluntary initiatives, na-
tional legal regimes, soft international law or a binding code of conduct through a treaty.
Patrick Macklein proposes a hybrid regulatory initiative that draws explicitly upon ex-
perience with corporate codes of conduct and indeed would make them the centrepiece of
a legally enforceable model.1 ° He argues that WTO rules authorize a state to require all
locally incorporated companies and other corporations seeking domestic market access to
adopt an enforceable code of conduct requiring production processes that respect core
international labor standards. The authority applies, however, only in respect to goods
produced for export. Unlike a negotiated convention or soft law standard that targets states,
the code of conduct attaches to the TNC itself and regulates working conditions wherever
the enterprise operates. Macklem acknowledges the model's limitations in that it does not
apply to production processes for domestic consumption and regulates by virtue of the
employment relation with the TNC rather than citizenship of a sovereign state.' The
proposal provides an alternative structure that sidesteps both the VWTO's refusal to assume
a role in enforcing labor standards through its trade rules and weaknesses in the ILO's
ability to enforce compliance with its own labor standards. Of course, it also assumes that
states have the market and political power to require code adoption. In fact, the political
will to do so may depend crucially upon the force of civil society advocacy.
The United Nations has also initiated a model for long-term standard-setting based upon
shared experimentation and learning. In 1999 the U.N. Secretary-General launched the
Global Compact to promote the aims of global corporate citizenship and social responsi-
bility. The Global Compact offers a learning model based upon an informal network of
U.N. agencies, TNCs, labor and NGOs that subscribe to nine principles. The Global
Compact's distinctive approach is to develop learning and dialogue among participants with
a view to creating corporate practices that attract broad social consensus and legitimacy. In
doing so, it seeks to translate complex, ambiguous and incomplete principles into standards
that are born of participants' experience and best practice.' Participating corporations are
asked to work on these principles in their own domains and to annually post on the Global
Compact's Web site steps they have taken to act on any of the principles. A learning bank
is to be developed from such postings. The Compact initiative represents an act of faith in
169. Ratner, supra note 13, at 496-522.
170. Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, 5 J. INr' EcoN. L. 605 (2002).
171. Id.
172. THE GLOBAL COMPACT, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org:80/PortalU. The Global Compact
principles are the protection of international human rights within participants' spheres of influence; non-
complicity in human rights abuses; freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining; the elimination of forced and compulsory labour and the effective abolition of child labour; the
elimination of discrimination in employment; support for a precautionary approach to environmental chal-
lenges; undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and encouragement of the de-
velopment and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.
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education and cooperation to produce an irresistible momentum for global change among
enterprises. Some NGOs have urged the U.N. to use the forum provided by the Compact
to develop a binding, multilateral legal regime for human rights, labor rights and the
environment, and not be content with a purely voluntary, generally stated, aspirational
model.'73
Another U.N. initiative, presently gestating, appears to hold more feasible prospects of
international human rights standard-setting consistent with the benchmarks identified
above. In 1999 the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights (the main subsidiary body of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights), "deeply
concerned at the preponderance of the transnational corporations in all spheres of life and
at the impact of their activities and working methods on human rights," established a work-
ing group on the working methods and activities of TNCs.17 4 The working group has
exposed for comment drafts of a body of "Human Rights Responsibilities" of TNCs (Re-
sponsibilities). 175 The Responsibilities acknowledge that states remain the principal guar-
antors against abuses of human rights and that the states have the "primary responsibility"
to respect human rights and prevent their abuse; however, TNCs are also required to do
so within their own spheres of activity. The Responsibilities provide a detailed standard
with rights covering equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment, personal security,
labor rights, respect for national sovereignty and human rights, and obligations with regard
to consumer and environmental protection. The norms are drawn from existing voluntary
codes and guidelines prepared by the OECD, ILO, corporations, unions, and NGOs.
The draft proposes that the Responsibilities be implemented through internalization
within the TNC's own practice, extended through arrangements with contractors, suppliers
and licensees, and reinforced by annual reporting of compliance which is subject to periodic
independent monitoring. TNCs are to establish confidential avenues through which work-
ers can file complaints alleging breach of the Responsibilities, and the TNC must provide
an independent investigation of complaints. The draft proposes that U.N. human rights
treaty bodies monitor implementation through additional reporting by states and that the
U.N. might also use the Responsibilities as the basis for procurement decisions. The U.N.
Commission on Human Rights might establish a group of experts, Special Rapporteur, or
working groups to receive information and take action when businesses fail to comply with
the Responsibilities. There is provision for reparation to persons adversely affected by
breach of the Responsibilities, enforced by national courts.
The draft Human Rights Responsibilities are the counterparts of well established codes
adopted by U.N. agencies to deal with issues such as the marketing of baby milk substitutes,
the distribution and use of pesticides, and consumer protection. 17 6 The Responsibilities have
173. See, e.g., Letter from Human Rights Watch to Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General (July 28, 2000),
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/07/hrw-ltr-july.htm.
174. U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Res. 2001/3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2001/3 (2001).
175. RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD
TO HusMAN RIGHTS, UNCHR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13 (2002), available at htp://
www.business-humanrights.org/Draft-UN-Human-Rights-Responsibilities-of-Business-Aug-2002.htm; Draft
Commentary on the Norms of Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights (2002), available at http://wwwl.urmn.edu/humanrts/links/businessresponsibilitycomm-
2002.html. The norms are intended to apply to business enterprises, incorporated and unincorporated, whose
activities are not entirely local or involve violations of the right to personal security (sect I).
176. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 17, at 143-45.
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singular advantages. First, they draw upon the established body of human rights codes of
conduct to distil a comprehensive set of standards whose authority is grounded in the
accumulated experience of users. The Responsibilities offer balanced and specific guidance
to TNCs and may be expected to play a unifying, modelling role in relation to future
corporate, industry and civil society code initiatives. Second, the standards locate respon-
sibility for implementation with TNCs themselves, through their own internal processes
but subject to independent moderation through the U.N. treaty monitoring system. Third,
the Responsibilities retain the primarily responsibility of states for human rights protection
and enforcement but bolstered by recognition of the responsibilities imposed upon TNCs.
Fourth, in their substance and in the processes for their development and implementation,
the Responsibilities appear to satisfy each of the benchmarks identified above.
VI. Conclusion
States have the primary responsibility for protecting human rights and ensuring that
companies operating in their jurisdiction do not breach international human rights norms.
However, states where human rights protection is most needed are often those least able
to enforce them against TNCs who possess desired investment capital or technology. It is
no answer to simply say that states should do more to force TNCs to meet human rights
standards; a further modality is needed to support TNC observance.
Each of the principal mechanisms that have emerged to support state responsibility for
human rights protection TNCs has serious weaknesses. What is presently required is an
international coordinating mechanism to secure broad agreement as to the desirable content
of norms of TNC responsibility and to provide a modality for their implementation. The
foundations for such a mechanism may well lie in the initiative of the U.N. Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the gestating draft
Human Rights Responsibilities. They provide for a complementary approach for interna-
tional legal regulation of TNCs to accompany voluntary codes and the cohering influence
of an authoritative set of norms of TNC responsibility.
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